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NOTES
NESBITT V. UNITED STATES: DENYING AN
IMPLIED TAX LIEN EXCEPTION TO
THE FEDERAL PRIORITY IN
INSOLVENCY
The court isfaced with the task ofprobing the murky depths of a
complex conundrumv to drag out and make manifest what f any-
thing is left of the Insolvency Statute after enactment of the Federal
Tax Lien Act of 1966.1
The first Congress of the United States secured the payment of duties
imposed upon ships and imported merchandise by providing for federal
priority in the distribution of the assets of insolvent bondholders who
failed to satisfy such duties.' By the Act of March 3, 1797,3 Congress ex-
tended the federal priority to all insolvent debtors. Until 1982, the Insol-
vency Statute survived as 31 U.S.C. § 191, otherwise referred to as section
3466 of the Revised Statutes.4 Section 3466 states:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insol-
vent, or whenever the estate of the deceased debtor, in the hands
of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the
debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States
shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as
well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to
pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment5 thereof, or in
1. James Talcott, Inc. v. Roto Am. Corp., 123 N.J. Super. 183, 191, 302 A.2d 147, 151
(1973) (Trautwein, J.).
2. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 21, 1 Stat. 42 (1845) (amended by the Act of Mar. 3,
1797).
3. Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515 (1845) (current version at 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 3713 (West 1983)).
4. REv. STAT § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (current version at
31 U.S.C.A. § 3713 (West 1983)).
5. "A voluntary assignment has been defined as a transfer without compulsion of law
by a debtor of his property to an assignee in trust to apply the same or the proceeds thereof
to the payment of his debts and to return the surplus, if any, to the debtor." United States v.
Fabricated Air Prods. Co., 206 F. Supp. 228, 231 (E.D. Tex. 1962) (citing United States v.
Gotwals, 156 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 781 (1946)).
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which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or ab-
sent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an
act of bankruptcy6 is committed. The priority established under
this section does not apply, however, in a case under title 11. 7
The statute expressly exempts title 11 bankruptcy cases from the opera-
tion of the federal priority.8 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court
has restricted the application of the Insolvency Statute by narrowing the
definition of "insolvency." In general, the Supreme Court has concluded
6. An "act of bankruptcy" is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976) (repealed 1978):
Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having (1) concealed, removed,
or permitted to be concealed or removed any part of his property, with intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or any of them, or made or suffered a trans-
fer of any of his property, fraudulent under the provisions of section 107 or 110 of
this title; or (2) made or suffered a preferential transfer, as defined in subdivision
(a) of section 96 of this title; or (3) suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any credi-
tor to obtain a lien upon any of his property through legal proceedings or distraint
and not having vacated or discharged such lien within thirty days from the date
thereof or at least five days before the date set for any sale or other disposition of
such property; or (4) made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors; or
(5) while insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature, procured, permitted,
or suffered voluntarily or involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to
take charge of his property; or (6) admitted in writing his inability to pay his debts
and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt.
Congress entirely revised the Bankruptcy Act by the Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
tit. I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as title 11 of the United States Code (1982)). As
revised, title 11 does not include a definition for an "act of bankruptcy."
7. 31 U.S.C.A. § 191 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (footnotes added) (current version at 31
U.S.C. § 3713 (West 1983). Congress added the last sentence to the Insolvency Statute in
1978 by Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit III, § 322(a), 92 Stat. 2678 (1978).
8. Though the Insolvency Statute is triggered by "acts of bankruptcy" as defined by
the Bankruptcy Act, § 3466 is inapplicable if the act of bankruptcy is followed by a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Under title 11, which governs bankruptcy proceedings, the federal gov-
ernment does not enjoy the breadth of priority recognized by the Insolvency Statute.
Indeed, for more than a century under bankruptcy law, prior mortgages and liens generally
have been given priority over federal claims against an insolvent debtor. See Plumb, The
Federal Priority in Insolvency: Proposalsfor Reform, 70 MICH. L. REV. 3, 6 (1971). Profes-
sor Plumb has described the effect of this statutory discrepancy:
[Als a result of the continuing discrepancies between the bankruptcy and insol-
vency rules, some creditors have had a distinct incentive to throw into bankruptcy
a debtor whose case might have been handled, with less expense and less burden
on the federal courts, in another form of proceeding. In those circumstances in
which bankruptcy is not an available alternative [e.g., decedents' estates], unjust
discrimination against creditors results from the more stringent priority rule of Sec-
tion 3466. And, when federal tax claims are involved, the hard-won and much-
needed protections provided for secured creditors and certain lienors by the Fed-
eral Tax Lien Act may be nullified if the debtor becomes insolvent but bankruptcy
does not ensue--the very circumstance in which those protections would become of
crucial importance.
Id at 8-9 (footnotes omitted).
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that the federal priority is inapplicable unless the insolvent debtor has re-
tained ownership but lost possession and control of the property.9 Thus,
the federal priority applies if the property of a deceased debtor passes to an
executor; the priority is inapplicable if the debtor is temporarily unable to
pay ordinary business debts. 1 Beyond these limitations, the Insolvency
Statute recognizes no exceptions to the federal priority in the distribution
of the assets or estate of an insolvent debtor." When the government as-
serts the priority against an insolvent tax debtor, however, section 3466
apparently collides with the provisions of the Federal Tax Lien Statute.
Section 6321 of the Federal Tax Lien Statute creates a lien in favor of
the federal government upon all the property of a delinquent taxpayer.' 2
The lien assures that a debtor may not avoid his tax liability by divesting
himself of his property. ' 3 In 1913, Congress recognized that innocent third
parties could come into possession of a tax debtor's property without no-
tice of the federal lien. To protect these parties, Congress provided by the
Act of March 4, 1913, that an unrecorded federal tax lien would be ineffec-
tive against innocent purchasers, mortgagees and judgment creditors.' 4
Through passage of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966,' Congress rede-
fined the class of persons protected against the operation of an unrecorded
federal tax lien. In particular, section 6323(a) of the 1966 Act provides:
9. In United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253 (1923), the Supreme Court defined
"insolvency" within the meaning of the Insolvency Statute. The Court stated:
Mere inability of the debtor to pay all his debts in [the] ordinary course of busi-
ness is not insolvency within the meaning of the act, but it must be manifested in
one of the modes pointed out in the latter part of the statute which defines or
explains the meaning of insolvency referred to in the earlier part.
Id. at 260. In other words, except in the case of a decedent's estate, the Insolvency Statute is
inapplicable in the distribution of the property of a debtor unless (1) the debtor makes a
voluntary assignment of his property; (2) by absconding, the debtor permits the attachment
of his property by process of law; or (3) the debtor commits an act of bankruptcy. See 31
U.S.C. § 191 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
10. See supra note 9.
11. United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 357 (1964). The Internal Revenue Service
has not challenged judicially created exceptions for administrative expenses, funeral ex-
penses, and certain widows' allowances. Plumb, supra note 8, at 4.
12. Section 6321 states:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or
assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto)
shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to prop-
erty, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.
26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982).
13. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
14. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016 (1913) (current version codified at 26
U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1982)). See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
15. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966).
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The lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against
any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or
judgment lien creditor until notice thereof which meets the re-
quirements of subsection (016 has been filed by the Secretary. 17
Thus, during the distribution of a debtor's assets, these classes,'8 under
the Federal Tax Lien Act, take priority over the United States if the gov-
ernment's claim is founded upon an unrecorded tax lien. The question
arises, however, whether the government under section 3466 may never-
theless assert priority if the debtor is insolvent. If so, members of the fa-
vored classes seemingly are subjected to a tax lien variation of "Catch-
22": 19 the priority accorded them by the tax lien legislation is only effec-
tive in the distribution of the assets of a solvent debtor-in which case, the
issue of priority is wholly academic as the debtor is capable of satisfying
all claims against him. Because of this apparent inconsistency in the two
statutes, some courts have ruled that the Federal Tax Lien Act created an
implied exception to the operation of section 3466.20
On September 12, 1982, Congress modernized without substantively
changing the language of the Insolvency Statute.2' The restatement did
16. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(0 (1982). This subsection describes the procedure whereby notice
of the federal tax lien shall be filed.
17. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1982) (footnote added).
18. Definitions of "purchaser," "security interest," and "mechanic's lienor" are pro-
vided at 26 U.S.C. § 6323(h) (1982).
19. The protagonist of Joseph Heller's novel CATCH-22 (Simon & Schuster 1961) faced
an analogous dilemma. As a crewman of a World War II bomber, he sought to take advan-
tage of a military regulation that excused the insane from flying hazardous missions. A
complementary regulation, however, provided that the assertion of the insanity rule consti-
tuted proof of sanity. Similarly, the Insolvency Statute seems to negate the protection ac-
corded to certain classes of creditors by the Federal Tax Lien Act.
20. "To hold otherwise," explained Judge Trautwein of the Superior Court of New
Jersey, "would render nugatory. . . 'all the time, attention and effort expended in drafting,
considering and passing the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966' one of the purposes of which was
to remove the super-priorities accorded tax claims." James Talcott, Inc. v. Roto Am. Corp.,
123 N.J. Super. 183, 191, 302 A.2d 147, 151 (1973) (quoting H.B. Agsten & Sons v. Hunting-
ton Trust & Say. Bank, 388 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1967) (Haynsworth, C.J., concurring)).
21. See Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 1, 96 Stat. 972 (1982) (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 3713
(West 1983)). The new language reads:
Priority of Government Claims
(a)(1) A claim of the United States Government shall be paid first when-
(A) a person indebted to the Government is insolvent and-
(i) the debtor without enough property to pay all debts makes a voluntary as-
signment of property;
(ii) property of the debtor, if absent, is attached; or
(iii) an act of bankruptcy is committed; or
(B) the estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the executor or administra-
tor, is not enough to pay all debts of the debtor.
(2) This subsection does not apply to a case under title 11.
[Vol. 33:741
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not resolve or in any manner affect the conflict between the Insolvency
Statute and the Federal Tax Lien Act.
The statutory conflict arises when the United States and a party pro-
tected by the Federal Tax Lien Act assert competing claims against the
property of a mutual debtor. The Supreme Court's restricted definition of
"insolvency" limits the occurrence of the conflict to those cases in which
the debtor retains ownership but has lost possession and control of the
disputed property."2 Typically, the conflict arises in either of two analo-
gous factual situations: (1) the property of an insolvent business passes to
a receiver for distribution to creditors;23 (2) the property of a deceased
insolvent individual passes to an executor for distribution to creditors.
The facts of Nesbitt v. United States25 exemplify the latter case.
The controversy in Nesbitt arose following the death of Franklyn K.
Brann on May 26, 1976.26 The deceased left to his estate a 13% interest in
certain "Capp Street property" and a legacy of debt surpassing $280,000.27
Brann's several creditors agreed that the deceased's interest in the "Capp
Street property" should be sold and that all competing claims should at-
tach to the sales proceeds with the same priority as such claims had with
respect to the property itself.2" The sale yielded $39,839.51.29
Marie Nesbitt, holder of a $225,061 judgment against Brann,30 instituted
suit against her competing creditors. Nesbitt claimed that her judgment
lien, perfected and recorded under state law prior to several United States
tax liens representing a tax liability of at least $54,167.54, took priority
The nonsubstantive nature of the changes made to the Insolvency Statute is explained in the
House Report that accompanied the passage of the restatement. See H.R. REP. No. 651,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 134, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1895, 2028.
Because the various courts addressing the issue discussed in this Note have dealt with the
unamended version of the Insolvency Statute, and often referred to the statute as section
3466, this Note for convenience likewise will refer to the Insolvency Statute as section 3466.
22. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., City of Vermillion v. Stan Houston Equip. Co., 341 F. Supp. 707 (D.S.D.
1972); Back v. IRS, 51 Md. App. 681, 445 A.2d 1057 (1982); James Talcott, Inc. v. Roto Am.
Corp., 123 N.J. Super. 183, 302 A.2d 147 (1973); National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N.C.
35,72 S.E.2d 109 (1952).
24. See, e.g., In re Estate of Berretta, 493 Pa. 441, 426 A.2d 1098 (1981); In re Decker's
Estate, 355 Pa. 331, 49 A.2d 714 (1946), cert. denied, sub nom Decker v. Kann, 331 U.S. 807
(1947); In re Meyer's Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A.2d 210 (1946).
25. Nesbitt v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 622 F.2d 433 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981).
26. Nesbitt, 445 F. Supp. at 826.
27. Id at 825-26.
28. Id at 826.
29. Id
30. Id
31. Id at 826 n.2. In its cross-claim, the United States claimed a tax liability of
1984]
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over such liability under section 6323(a) of the Federal Tax Lien Act.3 2
Conceding that Nesbitt's lien would take priority if Brann's estate were
solvent, the United States contended that because the proceeds of the
property were insufficient to satisfy all claims against the property, the
United States should be accorded priority under section 3466. 33
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United
States. In an opinion later affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit,34 Judge Charles Renfrew concluded that nothing in
the legislative history of the Federal Tax Lien Act manifested congres-
sional intent to supplant or amend the operation of section 3466.1' More-
over, Judge Renfrew found that the two statutes were not entirely
inconsistent. In his view, section 3466 did not negate the limited priority
accorded the four favored classes by the Federal Tax Lien Act.3 6 Al-
though he recognized that the statutes represented conflicting policies,
37
Judge Renfrew denied the existence of an implied tax lien exception to the
federal priority in insolvency.
This Note will discuss the propriety of the Nesbitt decision in light of the
legislative purposes underlying the Insolvency Statute and the Federal Tax
Lien Act. Also, it will identify the principal arguments advanced by other
courts in resolving the conflict between these two statutes. This Note will
examine the effect upon these principal arguments of several analogous
United States Supreme Court decisions involving the federal priority in
insolvency. By applying guidelines established by the Supreme Court, this
Note will evaluate the validity of the conflicting arguments. It will con-
clude that although Nesbitt adheres to the Supreme Court's guidelines,
policy considerations suggest that Congress ultimately should provide a
contrary resolution to the conflict between the Insolvency Statute and the
Federal Tax Lien Act.
$54,167.54. But in a separate declaration, the United States claimed a tax liability of
$89,160.06. As the Capp Street proceeds were insufficient to satisfy either figure, the court
did not have to resolve this discrepancy. Id
32. Id. at 827.
33. Id. at 826.
34. Nesbitt v. United States, 622 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984
(1981). In August 1982, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
endorsed the Nesbitt opinion in Durham v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 1093, 1096 (D.N.J.
1982), afdmen., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983).
35. Nesbitt, 445 F. Supp. at 829-30.
36. Id
37. Id at 830.
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I. A TALE OF Two STATUTES: THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL
PRIORITY IN INSOLVENCY AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE
FEDERAL TAX LIEN ACT
The Insolvency Statute grants priority to the United States government
in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent debtor.38 The Federal Tax
Lien Act subordinates federal tax liens to previously recorded private liens
held by certain protected classes.39 When the United States government
and a protected private creditor compete for the assets or estate of an insol-
vent tax debtor, the statutes apparently conflict if the United States has
failed to record its tax lien prior to the recordation of the private lien.
Under section 3466, the government derives priority through the insol-
vency of the debtor; under the Federal Tax Lien Act, the private creditor
derives priority through the prior recordation of its lien. The court adjudi-
cating the dispute must give controlling effect to one statute at the expense
of the other. In particular, the court must decide whether (1) section 3466,
though not admitting on its face of such a limitation, is inapplicable if a
protected creditor has filed a private lien prior to the recordation of the
government's tax lien; or (2) the Federal Tax Lien Act, though not admit-
ting on its face of such a limitation, is inapplicable if the debtor is insol-
vent. In other words, the court must determine the priority of the
competing claims by creating an implied exception to the statutory lan-
guage of either the Insolvency Statute or the Federal Tax Lien Act. In
choosing between these alternatives, the court must consider the rules of
construction governing statutes that are separately unambiguous but re-
pugnant when read together.40
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to effectuate legislative
intent.41 If two statutes are inconsistent, a court may give the statutes a
practical application that will reflect the legislative intent of each.42 Thus,
to reconcile the Federal Tax Lien Act with section 3466, the court must
identify the intent behind each statute. To determine intent, the court
must examine the circumstances and policies that led to the enactment of
38. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 311-440 (1953).
41. See Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 385-86 (1948); United States v.
N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 53 (1942).
42. See, e.g., Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 506 (1936); Walling v. Pat-
ton-Tulley Transp. Co., 134 F.2d 945, 948 (6th Cir. 1943); Scofield v. Board of Educ., 411111.
11, 103 N.E.2d 640 (1952); People ex rel. Simpson v. Funkhouser, 385 IUl. 396, 52 N.E.2d
1014 (1944).
1984]
Catholic University Law Review
each statute and the objectives that Congress sought to accomplish.43 This
section undertakes such an examination.
In 1832, in United States v. State Bank,' the United States Supreme
Court identified the purpose of the Insolvency Statute. In State Bank, a
debtor created a trust for the payment of his debts. The assignment of the
debtor's estate to the trustee established the insolvency of the debtor.45 As
the trust instrument purported to accord priority to certain creditors over
the United States, the federal government challenged the trust arrange-
ment as violative of the Insolvency Statute.46 The debtor defended the
trust on the grounds that the federal priority applied only to debts arising
after the moment of insolvency.47 The Supreme Court conceded that the
Insolvency Statute, though modeled upon the English royal prerogative,48
was merely statutory in nature and subject to exceptions and limitations
created by Congress. 49 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the statute
must be construed broadly in order to effectuate the vital congressional
purpose underlying the statute.5° The Court identified that purpose as the
assurance of an adequate revenue to discharge the debts and obligations of
the national government. 5 In rejecting the debtor's narrow interpretation,
the Supreme Court adopted a deferential attitude toward the Insolvency
Statute that has continued to the present.5"
Such deference, however, could not cure a defect in the Insolvency Stat-
43. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 335-37 (1950); Stonite Prods. Co. v.
Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563-66 (1942).
44. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29 (1832).
45. Id. at 34.
46. Id
47. Id
48. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 77, 80 (1975); United States v. Key, 397 U.S.
322, 324 (1970); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 372-74 (1805).
49. State Bank, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 35; see Moore, 423 U.S. at 81.
50. State Bank, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 35.
51. Id The Supreme Court described the purpose and nature of the Insolvency Statute
as follows:
The right of priority of payment of debts due to the government is a prerogative
of the crown well known to the common law. It is founded not so much upon any
personal advantage to the sovereign, as upon motives of public policy, in order to
secure an adequate revenue to sustain the public burdens and discharge the public
debts. The claim of the United States, however, does not stand upon any sovereign
prerogative, but is exclusively founded upon the actual provisions of their own
statutes. The same policy, which governed in the case of the royal prerogative,
may be clearly traced in these statutes; and as that policy has mainly a reference to
the public good, there is no reason for giving to them a strict and narrow interpre-
tation. Like all other statutes of this nature, they ought to receive a fair and rea-
sonable interpretation, according to the just import of their terms.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 115-65.
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ute previously identified by the Supreme Court in United States v. Fisher."
The Court in Fisher declared that the federal priority did not constitute a
lien upon a debtor's property. Therefore, the Court stated, the federal gov-
ernment could not satisfy a claim under the Insolvency Statute by pursuing
property divested from the possession of the debtor.5 4 In Thelusson v.
Smith," the Supreme Court elaborated: "The United States are [sic] to be
first satisfied; but then it must be out of the debtor's estate."56 In Thelus-
son, a judgment creditor competed with the government for the property
of an insolvent debtor.57 Although the creditor had obtained its judgment
prior to the assignment of the debtor's property to a trust for the benefit of
creditors,58 and thus prior to the moment of legal insolvency, the Court
accorded priority to the United States because the unexecuted judgment
lien had not terminated the debtor's ownership rights in the property.59
The Court stated, however, that a different result would be warranted if
the debtor had conveyed or mortgaged his property to a third party. The
Court concluded that a bonafide divestiture would defeat the federal pri-
53. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
54. Id. at 390-96.
55. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 396 (1817).
56. Id at 426.
57. Id at 397-98.
58. Id. at 397.
59. Id at 424-26. The Court left unsettled the question whether a specific and perfected
(or "choate") lien defeats the federal priority. See Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 386, 440-43 (1828). In numerous subsequent cases, the Court has never found any
judgment lien to be sufficiently "choate" to warrant resolution of the issue. See, e.g., United
States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 358 n.8 (1964); United States v. Gilbert Assocs., 345 U.S.
361, 365 (1953); Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1946); United
States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 355 (1945); Brent v. Bank of Wash.,
35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 596, 611-12 (1836). In any event, the Court has narrowed the definition of
"choateness" to such a degree as to assure that in most if not all cases, a judgment lien held
by a third party will not interfere with the federal government's claim to the property of an
insolvent debtor. See Plumb, supra note 8, at 4.
In Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946), the Supreme Court enunci-
ated the test to determine whether a lien is choate for purposes of the Insolvency Statute.
The Court stated:
The long established rule requires that the lien must be definite, and not merely
ascertainable in the future by taking further steps, in at least three respects as of the
crucial time. These are: (1) the identity of the lienor; (2) the amount of the lien;
and (3) the property to which it attaches. It is not enough that the lienor has power
to bring these elements, or any of them, down from broad generality to the earth of
specific identity.
Id at 375 (citations omitted). In the later case of United States v. Gilbert Assocs., 345 U.S.
361 (1953), the Supreme Court simplified the test. There the Court stated: "'[S]pecificity'
requires that the lien be attached to certain property by reducing it to possession, on the
theory that the United States has no claim against property no longer in the possession of the
debtor. Until such possession, it remains a general lien." Id at 366 (citation omitted).
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ority in insolvency.6"
Thus, these early Supreme Court decisions established that the purpose
of the Insolvency Statute was to assure adequate revenue to discharge the
debts and obligations of the federal government. If section 3466 and the
Federal Tax Lien Act are to be reconciled in a manner that respects the
congressional objectives underlying each statute, the purpose of the Fed-
eral Tax Lien Act must also be identified. Interestingly, the legislative his-
tory of the Federal Tax Lien Act reveals that the statute evolved from the
loophole in section 3466 through which a debtor could defeat the federal
priority by divesting himself of his property.
To prevent the severance of property from the claims of the government,
Congress devised the tax lien in favor of the United States.6 ' By the Act of
July 13, 1866, Congress created a broad lien that would attach to all of the
property of any debtor immediately upon the debtor's failure to pay a fed-
eral tax when due.62 Congress intended that the 1866 tax lien would sup-
plement other methods of tax collection by making available to the United
States all property belonging to the debtor at the time the tax was as-
sessed. 63 Thus, in the field of tax debts, the 1866 lien closed the Insolvency
Statute loophole through which the debtor could defeat the federal priority
through divestiture.
Although the federal tax lien promoted the public welfare by protecting
federal revenues, the lien proved unduly burdensome to private parties
who dealt with tax debtors."' The potential inequity of the lien was made
manifest by the Supreme Court in 1893 in United States v. Snyder.65
60. Thelusson, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 426.
61. The Act of June 30, 1864 (the predecessor of the broad tax lien legislation enacted in
1866) created liens on particular sources of taxable revenue, e.g., distilleries, legacies, and
distributive shares of personal property. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 55, 125, 13 Stat.
224, 286 (1865) (amended by Act of July 13, 1866).
62. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 98, 107 (1868). In pertinent part, the Act
provided:
And if any person, bank, association, company, or corporation, liable to pay any
tax, shall neglect or refuse to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien
in favor of the United States from the time it was due until paid, with the interest,
penalties, and costs that may accrue in addition thereto, upon all property and
rights to property belonging to such person, bank, association, company, or corpo-
ration . ...
63. Nesbitt, 445 F. Supp. at 828 (citing 112 CONG. REc. 22,224 (1966) (statement of
Rep. Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Comm. and sponsor of the Federal Tax
Lien Act)).
64. See, e.g., MacKenzie v. United States, 109 F.2d 540, 542 (9th Cir. 1940) (tax lien
priorities enacted to relieve innocent purchasers and others from harsh enforcement of unre-
corded federal tax liens).
65. 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
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There, the federal government had demanded the payment of taxes from
Charles Snyder, a New Orleans tobacco dealer.66 Snyder failed to satisfy
the tax assessment and the federal tax lien attached to all of his property.67
Later, Snyder sold several tracts of land to the International Cotton Press
Company (International).68 Because the United States had failed to rec-
ord its lien in the local mortgage office, as required by the Louisiana Con-
stitution,69 International had been unable to ascertain the existence of the
encumbrance upon the property. Although International was an innocent
purchaser, the Supreme Court ruled that the land conveyed to Interna-
tional remained subject to the lien and that the government could collect
Snyder's tax debt through the forced sale of the property.7" The Court
reasoned that if federal taxes were subject to state regulation, the entire
existence of the national government would be "at the mercy of state
legislation."7
A similar controversy arose at the district court level in 1912. In United
States v. Curry,72 the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land applied Snyder and ruled that an unrecorded government tax lien was
unaffected by the transfer of property from the debtor to several "perfectly
innocent people. 73 Consequently, the court permitted the federal govern-
ment to collect its debt through the forced sale of the property acquired by
the innocent parties without notice of the federal lien. Though it enforced
the Snyder rule, the district court urged that the Federal Tax Lien Statute
be amended in order to prevent the recurrence of the inequity caused by
the operation of secret government liens.74 In particular, the court recom-
mended that the government be required to file its liens so that the public
would have an opportunity to discover the existence of such encumbrances
upon property.75
66. Id. at 210.
67. Id at 212.
68. Id. at 211.
69. Id at 213.
70. Id at 215.
71. Id. at 214. The Court explained its decision as follows:
If the United States, proceeding in one of their own courts, in the collection of a
tax admitted to be legitimate, can be thwarted by the plea of a state statute pre-
scribing that such a tax must be assessed and recorded under state regulation, and
limiting the time within which such tax shall be a lien, it would follow that the
potential existence of the government of the United States is at the mercy of state
legislation.
Id.
72. 201 F. 371 (D. Md. 1912).
73. Id. at 372-74.
74. Id at 374.
75. Id The court explained:
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Responding promptly to the Curry court's suggestion,76 Congress
amended the Federal Tax Lien Statute by the Act of March 4, 1913, 7 7 to
protect innocent purchasers, mortgagees and judgment creditors against
the operation of secret federal tax liens. Specifically, Congress provided
that the federal tax lien would be ineffective against members of these fa-
vored classes until notice of the lien had been "filed by the collector in the
office of the district court of the district within which the property subject
to such lien is situated., 78 Later, by the Revenue Act of 1939, Congress
added pledgees to the class of protected persons.79 Through passage of the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Congress again redefined this class. The
1966 Act afforded protection from the secret federal tax lien to "any pur-
chaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien
creditor."" ° Thus, the essential issue remained unchanged. The question
arises whether Congress, by protecting certain classes from the operation
of an unrecorded federal tax lien, also intended to protect these classes
from the federal priority in insolvency.
A court may give two repugnant statutes a practical application that will
effectuate the purposes of each.8' An examination of the congressional
It would seem that by a comparatively slight change of the statute law the rights
of the United States could be sufficiently protected without endangering the inter-
ests of other persons. The collector of internal revenue at the time he makes de-
mand upon the taxpayer might be required to transmit a copy of the demand to
some office in which judgments and other recognized liens upon real estate are
recorded and the records of which are consequently carefully examined by convey-
ancers. Whether public policy does or does not require that section 3186 [the Fed-
eral Tax Lien Statute] shall be repealed or amended in some such way as that
above suggested is a question of policy for Congress.
Id
76. In Ferris v. Chic-Mint Gum Co., 14 Del. Ch. 232, 124 A. 577 (1924), the Court of
Chancery of Delaware expressed the opinion that Congress "probably" enacted the tax lien
exceptions of 1913 in response to Curry. Ferris, 124 A. at 578. In any event, the United
States Supreme Court has acknowledged that "Congress enacted § 3672 [the tax lien excep-
tions] to meet the harsh condition created by the holding in United States v. Snyder, 149
U.S. 210 (1893), when federal liens were few, that a secret federal tax lien was good against a
purchaser for value without notice." United States v. Gilbert Assocs., 345 U.S. 361, 363-64
(1953).
77. Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016 (1913) (current version codified at 26
U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1982)).
78. Id
79. Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 401, 53 Stat. 883 (1939) (current version codified at
26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1982)).
80. Section 6323(a) of the Federal Tax Lien Act added "mechanic's ienor" and re-
placed "mortgagee" and "pledgee" with the broad term used by the Uniform Commercial
Code, "holder of a security interest." See S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966),
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3722, 3724-25.
81. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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purposes underlying the Insolvency Statute and the Federal Tax Lien Act,
however, discloses the impossibility of reconciling the statutes in a manner
that will respect the legislative purposes of both statutes. The Supreme
Court in United States v. State Bank declared that the purpose of the Insol-
vency Statute was to assure an adequate revenue to discharge the debts
and obligations of the national government. Through section 3466, Con-
gress sought to achieve this objective by subordinating the private interests
of private creditors to the national interest in maintaining the operation of
the federal government. Section 3466 represents a cold, practical policy
decision that the interests of individuals must yield to the public interest.8 2
In contrast, the Federal Tax Lien Act is founded upon considerations of
equity. In response to the harsh rule announced by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Snyder, Congress surrendered the government's right to
enforce an unrecorded federal tax lien against certain favored classes.83
Thus, the purposes underlying the Insolvency Statute and the Federal Tax
Lien Act are diametrically opposed. Arguably, no judicial construction
can effectuate the purposes or policies of both statutes.
The courts have recognized the futility of attempting to compromise the
provisions of the conflicting statutes. Rather, they have accepted the prin-
ciple that whenever the statutes conflict, either section 3466 or the Federal
Tax Lien Act must be fully enforced according to its own terms while the
disfavored statute must yield.84 In choosing between the statutes, the
courts have advanced several recurring arguments. The proper resolution
of the statutory conflict depends upon the validity of these competing
arguments.
II. THE PENNSYLVANIA CASES: A SURVEY OF THE CONFLICTING
ARGUMENTS
Two Pennsylvania state courts were the first to consider whether the fed-
eral tax lien legislation created an implied exception to the federal priority
in insolvency.85 In finding such an exception, the Pennsylvania courts ad-
82. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 1093, 1096 (D.N.J. 1982), afd
mem., 720 F.2d 661 (1983); City of Vermillion v. Stan Houston Equip. Co., 341 F. Supp.
707, 713 (D.S.D. 1972); James Talcott, Inc. v. Roto Am. Corp., 123 N.J. Super. 183, 190-92,
302 A.2d 147, 150-51 (1973). In each case, the court posed the question whether the federal
tax lien priorities operated as an implied exception to the federal priority in insolvency. By
framing the issue in this manner and supplying a simple negative or affirmative answer, each
court portrayed the conflict as a matter of choice between the tax lien legislation and the
Insolvency Statute rather than as a matter of compromise and accommodation.
85. In re Decker's Estate, 355 Pa. 331, 49 A.2d 714 (1946), cerl. denied, sub nom. Decker
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vanced two principal arguments: (1) as a matter of statutory construction,
the specific priorities of the tax lien legislation should prevail over the gen-
eral federal priority embodied in section 3466;86 or (2) as a matter of pub-
lic policy, the priorities of the tax lien legislation should remain effective in
the context of insolvency despite section 3466 in order to maintain com-
mercial stability.87 Succeeding courts, in resolving the statutory conflict,
have focused upon the validity of these two theories.8 Thus, an examina-
tion of these approaches will illuminate those considerations viewed by the
courts as determinative in resolving the conflict between the tax lien legis-
lation and the Insolvency Statute.
In 1946, the statutory conflict came before the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania in In re Meyer's Estate.89 Following the death of Albert P.
Meyer, the United States and the executors of a judgment creditor asserted
competing claims against Meyer's insolvent estate. The judgment creditor
had filed a lien upon Meyer's property prior to the recordation of the fed-
eral tax liens.9° According to the provisions of the Federal Tax Lien Stat-
ute, the government's liens were unenforceable against the holders of the
antecedent judgment lien. The United States argued, however, that the
priorities prescribed by the Federal Tax Lien Statute were irrelevant as the
debtor had never relinquished possession and control of the disputed prop-
erty. The government contended that it could collect its tax debt directly
v. Kann, 331 U.S. 807 (1947); In re Meyer's Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A.2d 210 (1946).
Judge Renfrew collected all of the cases addressing the issue prior to 1978 in Nesbitt, 445 F.
Supp. at 828 n.9.
Prior to these Pennsylvania decisions, several courts honored the tax lien priorities in the
context of insolvency without directly considering the apparent bar imposed by § 3466. See
Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Sobel, 175 Misc. 1067, 26 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y.C. Ct. 1940); Ferris
v. Chic-Mint Gum Co., 14 Del. Ch. 232, 124 A. 577 (1924). In Sobel, despite the insolvency
of the debtor, the government apparently did not argue the applicability of § 3466. The
government merely contended that the competing lien of a judgment creditor was "incho-
ate" and therefore ineffective. Sobel, 175 Misc. at 1069, 26 N.Y.S.2d at 146. The court
rejected the suggestion that the tax lien legislation included an implied qualification that a
judgment lien must be "choate." The court explained its view of the Federal Tax Lien
Statute:
The statute is an act of self-abnegation upon the part of the government in the
collection of taxes by which it must abide. No question of strict versus loose con-
struction arises. There is no room for construction, as the statute as to these classes
of persons [mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, and judgment creditors] is specific.
Id., 26 N.Y.S.2d at 147 (citation omitted).
86. Decker, 355 Pa. at 341, 49 A.2d at 720; Meyer, 159 Pa. Super. at 305, 48 A.2d at 215.
87. Decker, 355 Pa. at 341, 49 A.2d at 720.
88. See, e.g., Back v. IRS, 51 Md. App. 681,445 A.2d 1057 (1982); James Talcott, Inc. v.
Roto Am. Corp., 123 N.J. Super. 183, 302 A.2d 147 (1973); National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe,
236 N.C. 35, 72 S.E.2d 109 (1952); see also Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 748.
89. 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A.2d 210 (1946).
90. Id at 298, 48 A.2d at 212.
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from the insolvent's estate under section 3466 without benefit of its liens.91
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania viewed the problem as a matter of
statutory construction. In determining whether section 3466 or the Federal
Tax Lien Statute should control the distribution of the deceased debtor's
estate, the court identified two issues: 92 (1) whether the tax lien priorities
could reasonably be applied in distributing property that had never been
transferred from the possession of the debtor; and (2) whether the lien pri-
orities should be applied in disregard of the federal priority in insolvency.
In resolving the preliminary issue, the court stated that the Insolvency
Statute created a claim that was analogous to a lien upon property.
93
Therefore, it concluded that the government's claim under section 3466
could reasonably be subjected to the lien priorities regardless of the fact
that the federal claim to the nondivested property of the debtor did not
depend upon the enforceability of the federal lien. The similarity between
the enforcement of claims and the enforcement of liens induced the court
to believe that Congress intended the lien priorities to apply to tax claims
generally.94 Having disposed of the preliminary issue, the court then con-
sidered whether, in distributing the insolvent debtor's estate, the order of
priority prescribed by the Federal Tax Lien Statute should be applied
rather than the order mandated by section 3466. The court accepted as a
principle of construction that specific statutory provisions should prevail
over conflicting general provisions.95 Applying this principle, it ruled that
the specific priorities established by the Federal Tax Lien Statute should
prevail over the general federal priority embodied in section 3466.96 To
limit the operation of the tax lien priorities to those cases involving solvent
tax debtors, reasoned the court, would be to render the lien priorities
meaningless, as the issue of priority would be "unimportant" if the debtor
possessed sufficient assets to satisfy all the claims against him. 7
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id (citing Marshall v. New York, 254 U.S. 380 (1920)).
94. Meyer, 159 Pa. Super. at 298, 48 A.2d at 212.
95. Id. at 305, 48 A.2d at 215. Many courts have recognized the general rule that if two
statutes are irreconcilable, the later or more specific statute must prevail over the provisions
of the prior or more general piece of legislation. See, e.g., Hellmich v. Hellman, 273 U.S.
233 (1928); Hines, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 717, 725 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Ohio Valley Co., 510 F.2d 1184, 1189 (7th Cir. 1975); Bowman v. Texas Educ. Found., 454
F.2d 1097, 1101 (5th Cir. 1972).
96. Meyer, 159 Pa. Super. at 305, 48 A.2d at 215.
97. Id at 298, 48 A.2d at 213. The court elaborated:
If the assets of a debtor or his estate are adequate to pay all debts every claim
will be paid and the issue before us is then unimportant. If a debtor is solvent no
claim is imperiled. It is only when the funds are not sufficient to pay all claims,
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The Pennsylvania Superior Court's resolution of the preliminary issue
warrants comment. As discussed in Part I, the intent of Congress in creat-
ing the tax lien priorities was to protect certain favored parties who might
come into possession of a tax debtor's property without notice of a secret
federal lien. The congressional intent presupposes a conveyance of prop-
erty from the tax debtor to an innocent third party. Thus, the Veyer court
arguably erred in giving effect to the lien priorities in the absence of such a
conveyance. Moreover, the federal tax lien is merely a device to aid in the
collection of taxes. The lien secures a federal tax claim; the lien does not
create that claim.98 The government's claim for unpaid taxes exists inde-
pendently of the lien and may be enforced by any available means of tax
collection.9 9 Arguably, by enacting the tax lien priorities, Congress merely
intended in certain particular cases to remove the federal lien as an avail-
able tax collection device. If so, the Meyer court erred in using the tax lien
priorities to subordinate a federal tax claim that did not depend upon the
effectiveness of the federal lien, for the debtor had never divested himself
of his property.
Later in 1946, in In re Decker's Estate,"°° the conflict between section
3466 and the Federal Tax Lien Statute reappeared before the Pennsylvania
judiciary. In Decker, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court repeated the Meyer
court's statutory construction argument,' 0 ' but also advanced a policy ar-
gument to support its conclusion that the federal tax lien priorities created
an implied exception to the federal priority in insolvency. The court sug-
gested that the Federal Tax Lien Statute served an important commercial
that the question of priority becomes of real interest, and it was that situation that
moved Congress to give added protection to judgment creditors.
Id at 301, 48 A.2d at 213.
98. On the basis of the legislative history of the Federal Tax Lien Act, Judge Renfrew,
in Nesbitt, concluded that Congress intended the federal tax lien to serve merely as a device
to enhance the government's ability to collect debts existing independently of the lien. He
explained:
There is nothing in either the language or the legislative history of the act to
indicate that Congress intended to make tax liens the federal government's sole
remedy for the collection of unpaid taxes. To the contrary, Congress intended tax
liens to supplement existing means for the collection of taxes, including § 3466.
Nesbitt, 445 F. Supp. at 828.
99. Id
100. 355 Pa. 331, 49 A.2d 714 (1946), cert. denied, sub nom. Decker v. Kann, 331 U.S. 807
(1947). In Decker, a pledgee competed with the United States for the assets of an insolvent
debtor. Id at 331, 49 A.2d at 714.
101. The court argued that a construction of the Federal Tax Lien Statute that limited
the effectiveness of that statute to solvent debtors in deference to § 3466 "would be quite
unreasonable, since there could be no need or reason for such legislation if intended to
provide merely for relative priorities in the distribution of the assets of solvent debtors." Id
at 341, 49 A.2d at 720.
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function in assuring the dependability of security instruments. 10 2 To with-
draw the protection accorded mortgagees and pledgees by the statute in
the event of the subsequent insolvency of the mortgagor or purchaser, the
court argued, "would be to render pledges and mortgages practically
worthless as dependable securities."' 3
In 1981, in In re Berretta,'I4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reconsid-
ered the arguments advanced in Meyer and Decker. The facts were similar
to those in Meyer: the United States and a judgment creditor competed for
the property of an insolvent deceased debtor. 1°5 In a split opinion, the six
members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed an orphans' court
ruling that the judgment creditor, whose lien had been filed prior to the
recordation of the government's tax liens, derived priority in the distribu-
tion of the estate through the Federal Tax Lien Act.' 6 In other words, the
orphans' court ruled that the Federal Tax Lien Act operated as an implied
exception to the federal priority in insolvency. In support of affirmance,
Justice Flaherty reiterated the statutory construction argument advanced
in Meyer. '0 7 Moreover, he developed the policy argument previously sug-
gested in Decker. Justice Flaherty contended that the federal tax lien ex-
ceptions promoted commercial stability by assuring members of the
favored classes that their legitimate security interests in the property of a
debtor could not be disturbed by the existence of an unrecorded federal tax
lien.' To remove this assurance in the event of the insolvency of the
102. On petition for reargument, appellants in Decker asserted that the Federal Tax Lien
Statute was preempted in regard to estate tax liens by the estate tax provisions of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. Id In rejecting this argument, the court emphasized the importance of
the Federal Tax Lien Statute in assuring the dependability of security instruments. It con-
cluded that such assurance should not be removed through operation of the estate tax laws.
Id Though the court did not directly address the conflict between the tax lien legislation
and the Insolvency Statute, the underlying rationale of the court's decision applies with
equal force to that conflict.
103. 355 Pa. at 341, 49 A.2d at 720.
104. 493 Pa. 441, 426 A.2d 1098 (1981) (per curiam) (the court filed two opinions-an
Opinion in Support of Affirmance and an Opinion in Support of Reversal; the court being
equally divided, the decree of the lower court was affirmed).
105. Id at 445, 426 A.2d at 1099-1100.
106. Id at 447, 426 A.2d at 1101.
107. Id at 449 n.4, 457-58, 426 A.2d at 1102 n.4, 1106.
108. 1d at 455-56, 426 A.2d at 1105. Justice Flaherty adopted his policy argument from
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979), noting that Kimbell was "the most
recent expression of the United States Supreme Court on the policy considerations that un-
derlie the question of whether the government, even in the tax arena, is to be treated as an
ordinary creditor or as a creditor with super-priority." Berretta, 426 A.2d at 1103. In Kim-
bell, the Supreme Court applied state law in subordinating a lien held by the Small Business
Administration to a prior lien held by a private creditor even though the private lien was
"inchoate" at the time the government lien was filed. 440 U.S. at 739-40. Because of the
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debtor, he reasoned, "would undercut the reliability of the notice filing
system, which plays a crucial role in commercial dealings."' 9
Berretta is especially noteworthy in that the dissenting members of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court presented strong arguments contrary to
Meyer and Decker. The Meyer court had argued that as a matter of statu-
tory construction, the specific priorities of the federal tax lien legislation
should prevail over the general mandate of the Insolvency Statute. Dis-
senting in Berreta, Justice Roberts asserted that general rules of statutory
construction were inapplicable in cases involving the federal priority in
insolvency. As discussed in Part I, the United States Supreme Court his-
torically has displayed an attitude of deference toward the Insolvency Stat-
ute. Relying upon the Supreme Court's deference, Justice Roberts charged
that a specific statute should not prevail over the general mandate of sec-
tion 3466 unless the specific statute could be given no meaningful interpre-
tation without violating the federal priority in insolvency. I 10 In applying
this rule, he noted that section 3466 embraced only those cases of insol-
vency in which the debtor had lost possession and control of the disputed
property."' Because section 3466 did not preclude the meaningful opera-
tion of the tax lien priorities in cases involving other forms of insolvency,
Justice Roberts concluded that the Federal Tax Lien Act did not necessi-
tate recognition of an implied exception to the operation of section 3466. "'
In rejecting the Decker court's public policy argument, Justice Roberts as-
serted that the formulation of public policy was beyond the function of the
judiciary.113
The courts have advanced several recurring arguments in resolving the
conflict between the federal tax lien legislation and the Insolvency Statute.
Conveniently, in the Pennsylvania line of cases, all of these arguments ap-
reliance that creditors place in the commercial lien-filing system, the Court concluded that
the federal government must be subjected to the same rules of priority that govern private
lenders. Berretta, 493 Pa. at 454-56, 426 A.2d at 1104-05. Although Kimbell involved an
attempt by the federal government to collect a debt incurred voluntarily, and Berretta in-
volved the government as an involuntary creditor of a tax debtor, Justice Flaherty reasoned
that the Kimbell Court's "reasons to curb federal priority in lending situations also apply to
federal tax liens against insolvent estates." Id at 456, 426 A.2d at 1106.
109. Id at 455, 426 A.2d at 1105 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S.
715, 739 n.42 (1979)).
110. Berretta, 493 Pa. at 462-63, 426 A.2d at 1109 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
11. See supra note 9.
112. Berretia, 493 Pa. at 462-63, 426 A.2d at 1109 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
113. Justice Roberts stated that "the Opinion in Support of Affirmance has transformed
its view of what Congress should do into the presumption that Congress has in fact impliedly
repealed the Insolvency Statute as to tax liens." Id at 460, 426 A.2d at 1108 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis supplied by court).
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peared within the forum of a single state. Indeed, the Meyer and Decker
courts originated the principal arguments favoring recognition of an im-
plied tax lien exception to the federal priority in insolvency. The Meyer
and Decker arguments, as developed by Justice Flaherty in Berretta, may
be summarized as follows:
(1) Statutory construction. As a matter of statutory construction, the
specific priority provisions of the Federal Tax Lien Statute should prevail
over the general federal priority in insolvency.
(2) Public policy. As a matter of public policy, the tax lien priorities
should remain effective in the context of insolvency despite the mandate of
section 3466. This would promote commercial stability by assuring the
dependability of those security interests protected by the Federal Tax Lien
Statute.
In Berretta, the division in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court highlighted
the conflict between the Meyer and Decker arguments and opposing argu-
ments endorsed by other courts. These opposing arguments may be sum-
marized as follows:
(1) Statutory construction with deference to the Insolvency Statute. In
light of the deference shown by the United States Supreme Court to the
Insolvency Statute, ordinary rules of construction should not be applied to
resolve statutory conflicts involving section 3466. Rather, an asserted ex-
ception to the Insolvency Statute must be strictly scrutinized and disal-
lowed if the conflicting statute can be given any meaningful interpretation
that would eliminate the statutory conflict. Because section 3466 does not
preclude the meaningful operation of the tax lien priorities in cases involv-
ing divested property or forms of insolvency not covered by the Insolvency
Statute, an implied tax lien exception to the federal priority in insolvency
should be denied.
(2) Public policy with deference to the legislature. Though the Insolvency
Statute and the Federal Tax Lien Act represent conflicting policies, the
resolution or formulation of public policy is a legislative function that
should not be usurped by the courts.
Thus, the validity of these opposing sets of arguments turns largely upon
the proper degree of deference owed to the Insolvency Statute. If Justice
Roberts misconstrued the degree of deference advocated by the United
States Supreme Court, the conflict between section 3466 and the Federal
Tax Lien Act might fall within the ordinary rules of statutory construction.
Therefore, the Supreme Court decisions upon which Justice Roberts' argu-
ment is premised must be evaluated.
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III. SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE: THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE OF
DEFERENCE DUE THE INSOLVENCY STATUTE
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of
whether Congress, through the tax lien priorities, created an implied ex-
ception to the federal priority in insolvency. Nevertheless, when faced
with the problem of reconciling the Federal Tax Lien Act with section
3466, lower federal courts have looked to the Supreme Court for guidance.
As discussed in Part II, the resolution of the statutory conffict turns upon
the degree of deference due the Insolvency Statute. If section 3466 war-
rants no special deference, general rules of statutory construction suggest
that the broad federal priority in insolvency must yield to the specific pri-
orities prescribed by the Federal Tax Lien Act. In attempting to determine
the proper degree of deference owed to the Insolvency Statute, lower
courts have identified two relevant Supreme Court pronouncements con-
cerning the scope of the federal priority in insolvency. These two pro-
nouncements and the degree of deference derived from each may be
summarized as follows:
(1) Absolute deference. In United States v. Vermont, 14 the Supreme
Court stated that "Section 3466 on its face permits no exception whatso-
ever. . .. " 1 " The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Kentucky v. United States 6 construed this statement as a mandate pre-
cluding the recognition of any implied exceptions to the federal priority in
insolvency.
(2) Qualfied deference. In United States v. Emory," 7 the Supreme
Court stated that "[o]nly the plainest inconsistency would warrant our find-
ing an implied exception to the operation of so clear a command as that of
§ 3466."' 8 Lower courts have interpreted this statement inconsistently.
In City of Vermillion v. Stan Houston Equipment Co. ,'9 the United States
District Court for the District of South Dakota construed the statement as
permitting the application of ordinary rules of construction in resolving a
114. 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
115. Id at 357. The Supreme Court described the scope of the Insolvency Statute:
Section 3466 on its face permits no exception whatsoever from the statutory
command that "[w]henever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent
. . . debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied." The statute applies to
all the insolvent's debts to the Government, whether or not arising from taxes, and
whether or not secured by a lien.
Id See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
116. 383 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1967). See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
117. 314 U.S. 423 (1941).
118. Id at 433. For a discussion of Emory, see infra note 141 and accompanying text.
119. 341 F. Supp. 707 (D.S.D. 1972). See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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statutory conflict involving section 3466.120 Such a construction may be
termed "ordinary deference" to the Insolvency Statute. In contrast, Judge
Renfrew in Nesbitt v. United States accorded what may be termed "special
deference" to the Insolvency Statute by interpreting Emory in light of the
Supreme Court's later opinion in United States v. Key.121 Relying on Key,
Judge Renfrew converted the Emory Court's "plainest inconsistency" lan-
guage into a test by which to evaluate any implied statutory exception to
.the federal priority in insolvency. Disregarding ordinary rules of construc-
tion, Judge Renfrew concluded that a court must recognize an implied ex-
ception to the Insolvency Statute only if it is necessary to preserve an
effective sphere of operation to the statute allegedly conflicting with sec-
tion 3466.122 The following sections will examine the propriety of the in-
ferences drawn from these two Supreme Court pronouncements.
4. Absolute Deference
Though the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Vermont en-
couraged the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to adopt
an attitude of absolute deference to the Insolvency Statute, the Vermont
Court actually affirmed a decision that had suggested that the tax lien pri-
orities operated as an implied exception to section 3466. In Vermont, the
state and federal governments attempted to enforce competing liens
against the property of a tax debtor.1 23 Because the state lien had attached
to the property prior to the federal lien, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit ruled in favor of the state in accordance with the
provisions of the Federal Tax Lien Statute.' 24 As the federal government
had failed to establish the insolvency of the debtor, 125 the issue whether
section 3466 precluded the application of the tax lien priorities in the con-
text of insolvency did not arise. In dicta, however, the court of appeals
suggested that the lien priorities would remain effective regardless of the
insolvency of the debtor.
1 26
The Supreme Court appears to have affirmed on the basis that the fed-
eral government had failed to prove the insolvency of the debtor.' 27 By
120. 341 F. Supp. at 713.
121. 397 U.S. 322 (1970). See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
122. For a discussion of Judge Renfrew's opinion, see infra notes 166-79 and accompa-
nying text.
123. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 382.
124. 317 F.2d 446, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1963), ail'd, 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
125. 317 F.2d at 449.
126. Id at 449 n.3.
127. See H.B. Agsten & Sons v. Huntington Trust & Sav. Bank, 388 F.2d 156, 161-62
(4th Cir. 1967) (Haynsworth, C.J., concurring) (citing Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964)).
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focusing upon the solvency of the debtor in upholding the tax lien priori-
ties, the Court suggested that the lien priorities might not remain effective
in the context of insolvency. 128 In other words, the Court intimated that
the Federal Tax Lien Statute did not create an implied exception to the
federal priority in insolvency.1 29
The Sixth Circuit in Kentucky v. United States apparently construed Ver-
mont as a mandate that all contrary legislation must defer to the operation
of section 3466.130 In Kentucky, a judgment creditor and the United States
competed for the assets of an insolvent delinquent taxpayer. The creditor
claimed priority under the Federal Tax Lien Act as his judgment lien had
been filed prior to the government's tax lien.' Having determined that
the debtor was insolvent and that the judgment lien was not sufficiently
"choate" to remove the disputed property from the debtor's estate, the
court granted priority to the United States.' 32 Thus, the court based its
decision solely upon considerations pertaining to the applicability of the
Insolvency Statute in disregard of the provisions of the Federal Tax Lien
Act. In effect, the court dismissed the Federal Tax Lien Act as an inferior
expression of law that operated only when section 3466 was inapplicable.
Similarly, federal courts in Illinois'33 and Massachusetts134 have given
mandatory effect to the Vermont Court's observation that the plain lan-
guage of section 3466 allows no exceptions. 35
The retort to such reasoning, when applied to subordinate claims other-
wise protected by the Federal Tax Lien Act, is obvious. The plain lan-
guage of the Federal Tax Lien Act also allows no exceptions to the
statutory command that the federal tax lien "shall not be valid as against
any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment
128. Id
129. Indeed, the Court stated that "Section 3466 on its face permits no exception whatso-
ever." Vermont, 377 U.S. at 357.
130. 383 F.2d 13, 15 (6th Cir. 1967).
131. Id at 14.
132. Id at 15. The Supreme Court has left unsettled the question whether a "choate"
lien defeats the federal priority in insolvency by removing the disputed property from the
estate of the insolvent debtor. See supra note 59.
133. Spira v. United States, 76-2 U.S. TAx CAS. (CCH) 9600 (N.D. I11. 1976).
134. Wing v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1962). In Wing, the holders of a
mortgage and the United States asserted competing claims against the mortgaged property
of an insolvent tax debtor. The plaintiffs argued that the tax lien priorities operated as a bar
to recovery by the United States because the mortgage had been transferred to the plaintiff
prior to recordation of the government's tax lien. The court simply brushed the argument
aside by invoking the mandate of the Insolvency Statute. Id at 7.
135. United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 375 (1964). For the Supreme Court's full
statement, see supra note 115.
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lien creditor ... ,, 36 Facially, the statute applies equally to solvent and
insolvent debtors. Moreover, as conceded by the Supreme Court, the fed-
eral priority in insolvency is merely statutory in nature and subject to ex-
ceptions and limitations created by Congress. 137 Indeed, the Court itself
has recognized other implied exceptions to the federal priority. 38  For
136. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1982).
137. See United States v. State Bank of N.C., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 35 (1832) ("The claim
of the United States, however, does not stand upon any sovereign prerogative, but is exclu-
sively founded upon the actual provisions of their own statutes.").
138. See United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 U.S. 478 (1930); Cook County Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445 (1882). In Guaranty Trust, the Supreme Court recog-
* nized an implied exception to the Insolvency Statute arising under title II of the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920. Through the Act, Congress sought "to preserve for the nation substantially
the whole existing transportation system" by authorizing financial aid to railroads, which at
the time lacked necessary operating funds. Id at 484. The Court maintained that to
subordinate the title II claims of private creditors against an insolvent railroad to the claims
of the United States under § 3466 would defeat the general purpose of the Act:
It not only would have prevented the reestablishment of railroad credit among
bankers and investors, but it would even have seriously impaired the market value
of outstanding railroad securities. It would have deprived the carriers of the credit
commonly enjoyed from supplymen and others; would have seriously embarrassed
the carriers in their daily operations; and would have made necessary a great en-
largement of their working capital. The provision for loans under § 210 would
have been frustrated. For, carriers could ill afford voluntarily to contract new
debts thereunder which would displace,pro tanto, their existing bonded indebted-
ness. The entire spirit of the Act makes clear the purpose that the rule leading to
such consequences should not be applied.
280 U.S. at 485. The Supreme Court's concern for the effect of § 3466 upon the availability
of private credit is reflected in Justice Flaherty's policy argument in Berretta. See supra
notes 108-09 and accompanying text. In Guaranty Trust, however, the Court also found
support for its decision in the specific means provided for the collection of government debts
under the Transportation Act. It interpreted these means as suggesting that Congress did
not intend the United States to rely upon § 3466. Guaranty Trust, 280 U.S. at 485-86.
In Cook County Nat'l Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445 (1882), the Supreme Court
subordinated the claims of the United States to the prior claims of other creditors against an
insolvent bank. In holding that the national banking legislation impliedly withdrew na-
tional banks from the operation of § 3466, the Court relied upon the specificity of the legisla-
tion in regulating every aspect of national banks, including "the manner [in the event of
insolvency] in which their affairs shall be wound up, their circulating notes redeemed, and
other debts paid or their property applied towards such payment." Id at 448. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court prescribed a rule of statutory construction for determining
whether a statute operates as an implied exception to the Insolvency Statute:
[A]Ithough as a general rule the United States is not bound by the provisions of a
law in which they are not expressly mentioned, yet if a particular statute is clearly
designed to prescribe the only rules which should govern the subject to which it
relates, it will repeal any former one as to that subject.
Id at 451 (citing United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88 (1870) and Daviess v.
Fairbairn, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 636 (1845)) (emphasis added). In applying this rule to the con-
flict between § 3466 and the Federal Tax Lien Act, the arguable question arises whether the
Federal Tax Lien Act is "clearly designed to prescribe the only rules" governing the priority
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these reasons, the absolute deference to the Insolvency Statute adopted by
the Kentucky court is unjustified.
B. Qualified Deference
Whereas the Kentucky court relied upon the Supreme Court's Vermont
opinion, other courts have looked to United States v. Emory as authority
warranting an attitude of qualified deference to section 3466. In Emory,
the Supreme Court stated that "[o]nly the plainest inconsistency would
warrant our finding an implied exception to the operation of so clear a
command as that of § 3466."' 9 Courts have construed the "plainest in-
consistency" statement as an acknowledgment by the Supreme Court of
the possibility that a statute could create an implied exception to the fed-
eral priority in insolvency. The courts have differed, however, in their ap-
plication of the "plainest inconsistency" standard. Some courts have held
that the statement warrants the application of ordinary rules of statutory
construction. 40 Other courts, in formulating a stricter rule of construc-
tion, have construed it in light of the Supreme Court's precise method of
applying that standard. 14
In United States v. Emory, 42 the Supreme Court faced the issue whether
the "plainest inconsistency" existed between the Insolvency Statute and
the National Housing Act.' 43 In holding that such inconsistency did not
exist between the statutes, the Emory Court relied upon the absence in the
National Housing Act of an express relinquishment of the government's
priority.'44 In contrast to the National Housing Act, the Federal Tax Lien
Act expressly relinquishes the government's right to assert priority in the
distribution of a debtor's property against certain protected classes if the
government's claim is based upon an unrecorded tax lien. Thus, Emory
does not preclude the recognition of a tax lien exception to the federal
priority in insolvency.
In United States v. Key, the Supreme Court considered whether the
"plainest inconsistency" existed between section 3466 and chapter X of the
of competing claims held by the United States and members of the four classes protected by
the Federal Tax Lien Act.
139. 314 U.S. at 433.
140. See, e.g., City of Vermillion v. Stan Houston Equip. Co., 341 F. Supp. 707 (D.S.D.
1972).
141. See, e.g., Nesbitt, 445 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
142. 314 U.S. 423 (1941).
143. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
144. Emory, 314 U.S. at 430.
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Bankruptcy Act. 145 Rather than looking solely for an express statutory
relinquishment of the government's priority, however, the Supreme Court
developed a three-part test to determine the validity of an asserted excep-
tion to the federal priority in insolvency. The application of this test illus-
trates "special deference" to the Insolvency Statute.
The lower court in Key had formulated a plan for the reorganization of
an insolvent motor carrier under chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. ' 46 The
plan provided that state and local tax claims and the various claims of
unsecured creditors should be satisfied prior to the federal government's
claim for unpaid taxes. Though the plan provided that the federal claim
eventually would be paid in full through monthly installments, the United
States protested that, under section 3466, the federal claim should be satis-
fied first.' 47
At that time,' 48 sections 216 and 221 of chapter X prescribed that a
district judge should confirm a reorganization plan that was fair and feasi-
ble under the particular circumstances of the case. 149 In affirming the dis-
trict court's plan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that the grant of such judicial discretion would be mean-
ingless if the federal government could assert absolute priority under the
Insolvency Statute.' 50 Moreover, section 199 of chapter X forbade a reor-
ganization plan that did not provide for the full payment of federal taxes
unless the Secretary of the Treasury accepted a lesser amount.' 5 ' The Sev-
enth Circuit reasoned that the assurance of full payment of federal taxes
provided by section 199 would be redundant and meaningless if the gov-
145. 397 U.S. at 324-25.
146. Key v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ind. 1966), a d sub nom In re Han-
cock Trucking, Inc., 407 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Key, 397
U.S. 322 (1970).
147. 397 U.S. at 323.
148. Congress entirely revised the Bankruptcy Act by the Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-588, tit. I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as tit. 11 of the United States Code
(1982)).
149. The Supreme Court explained the operation of the pertinent sections of chapter X:
Section 216(7) provides that where a class of creditors dissents from a reorgani-
zation plan, the District Court shall provide "adequate protection for the realiza-
tion by them of the value of their claims against the property" in any of four ways,
the last and most general of which is by "such method as will, under and consistent
with the circumstances of the particular case, equitably and fairly provide such
protection." Section 221 merely sums up the applicable tests for a valid reorgani-
zation plan by providing that "It]he judge shall confirm a plan if satisfied that"
§ 199 has been complied with and that "the plan is fair and equitable, and
feasible."
Id. at 325-26.
150. In re Hancock Trucking, Inc., 407 F.2d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 1969).
151. Id. at 636-37.
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ernment could invoke the Insolvency Statute as well as section 199 in en-
forcing its tax claim.'" 2 The court concluded that these provisions of
chapter X presupposed the inapplicability of the Insolvency Statute in
cases arising under chapter X.153
On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether chapter X
created an implied exception to the federal priority in insolvency. At the
outset, the Court stated that the Insolvency Statute must be given a liberal
construction and that no exception could be inferred in the absence of the
"plainest inconsistency" between section 3466 and chapter X.154 In its ap-
plication of the "plainest inconsistency" standard, the Key Court focused
upon three considerations: (1) whether chapter X, on its face, was logically
inconsistent with the Insolvency Statute; (2) whether an unconditional ap-
plication of the Insolvency Statute would render chapter X redundant or
meaningless; and (3) whether the legislative history of chapter X indicated
that Congress intended to modify the operation of section 3466.1"
First, the Supreme Court determined that the statutes were not facially
inconsistent. 156 Though chapter X invested discretionary power in the
trial court to formulate an equitable plan of distribution, the Supreme
Court reasoned that an equitable plan necessarily would respect the legal
rights of the parties involved. As section 3466 granted to the federal gov-
ernment the legal right of priority in the distribution of the property of an
insolvent debtor, the Court concluded that chapter X on its face did not
provide authority for disregarding section 3466.157 Second, the Court de-
termined that an unconditional application of the Insolvency Statute
would not render chapter X redundant or meaningless.5 8 Because section
3466 applied only to some forms of insolvency,' 59 whereas chapter X ap-
plied to all forms of insolvency, the Court concluded that the assurance of
full payment of federal taxes provided by chapter X did not merely grant a
right that the federal government already enjoyed under section 3466.
Rather, the Court stated, chapter X extended the government's right to full
payment of taxes to those cases of insolvency not covered by section
3466.160 Third, the Court found no indication in the legislative history of
152. Id at 638.
153. Id
154. Key, 397 U.S. at 324-25.
155. Id at 326.
156. Id at 328-29.
157. Id. at 327.
158. Id. at 328-29.
159. Id at 329. See supra note 9 for the Court's definition of "insolvency" within the
meaning of the Insolvency Statute.
160. Key, 397 U.S. at 329.
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chapter X that Congress intended to override the Insolvency Statute.' 6 '
The Court noted that trial courts for many years had applied section 3466
in formulating reorganization plans under the Bankruptcy Act and that
Congress had failed to indicate disapproval of this practice. 62
Thus, the Key Court established a three-part test that may be used in
evaluating an asserted exception to the federal priority in insolvency. The
test rests upon the premise that a statute does not create an exception to the
federal priority unless the "plainest inconsistency" exists between that stat-
ute and section 3466. In effect, the test creates a rebuttable presumption
that Congress did not intend to modify the operation of the Insolvency
Statute. In Key, the Supreme Court established the means whereby a
plaintiff may rebut that presumption. Specifically, the Court held that a
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that section 3466 and the conflicting statute
are facially inconsistent; or (2) that an unconditional application of section
3466 would render the conflicting statute redundant or meaningless; or (3)
that the legislative history of the conflicting statute indicates that Congress
intended to modify the operation of section 3466. As the plaintiff in Key
failed to satisfy any of these conditions, the Court ruled that chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act did not create an implied exception to the federal pri-
ority in insolvency.
In contrast to the Nesbitt court's application of the "plainest inconsis-
tency" standard, the United States District Court for the District of South
Dakota in City of Vermillion v. Stan Houston Equipment CO. 163 apparently
construed Key to permit the application of ordinary rules of construction
in resolving the conflict between section 3466 and the Federal Tax Lien
Act. Though it invoked the "plainest inconsistency" statement, the district
court afforded no special deference to section 3466. The court simply as-
serted that the "plainest inconsistency" existed between the statutes and
that section 3466 must yield to the Federal-Tax Lien Act.'" Presumably,
the court acted upon the general rule that broad statutory provisions must
yield to specific, subsequently enacted legislation. 165
161. Id. at 329-32.
162. Id. at 332.
163. 341 F. Supp. 707 (D.S.D. 1972).
164. The Vermillion court's entire analysis is contained in one paragraph:
Congress could not have intended any other purpose for 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323(a)
than to give certain creditors priority over unfiled claims of the United States.
Therefore, 31 U.S.C.A. § 191 [the Insolvency Statute] does not apply here and does
not defeat the claim of the trustee in bankruptcy under 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323(a).
Id. at 713 (footnote omitted).
165. The rule of construction that broad statutory provisions must yield to specific, sub-
sequently enacted legislation is inherent in the Supreme Court's statement that the "plainest
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The Vermillion court's loose application of the "plainest inconsistency"
test is irreconcilable with the demanding three-part analysis adopted by
the Key Court. The Court created a presumption that Congress did not
intend to modify the long-standing, general mandate of section 3466
through any subsequent piece of legislation. This precluded the applica-
tion of ordinary rules of construction. By providing the means to rebut the
presumption, however, the Court also discredited the attitude of absolute
deference adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Kentucky. For these reasons,
Judge Renfrew in Nesbitt was correct in affording section 3466 special def-
erence in resolving the conflict between the Insolvency Statute and the
Federal Tax Lien Act. The question remains, however, whether the Nes-
bitt court correctly applied the Key test that embodies the standard of spe-
cial deference adopted by the Supreme Court.
IV. NEsBITT V UNITED STATES: APPLICATION OF THE "PLAINEST
INCONSISTENCY" TEST
A. Propriety of Application
The Supreme Court in United States v. Key established a specific test to
evaluate an asserted exception to the federal priority in insolvency. In Nes-
bitt v. United States, Judge Renfrew applied Key's "plainest inconsistency"
test in determining whether the Federal Tax Lien Act created an implied
exception to the operation of section 3466. Though the district court did
not expressly acknowledge that it was relying upon the three discrete ele-
ments of the test as developed by the Court in Key, its analysis included
each of these elements. Specifically, the district court considered: (1)
whether section 3466 and the Federal Tax Lien Act are facially inconsis-
tent; (2) whether an unconditional application of section 3466 would
render the tax lien priorities meaningless; and (3) whether the legislative
history of the Federal Tax Lien Act indicates that Congress intended to
amend the federal priority in insolvency.
First, the Nesbitt court noted that Congress intended the Federal Tax
Lien Act to facilitate the enforcement of federal tax claims.' 66 Section
3466, on the other hand, regulates the priority of the underlying claims
against the property of an insolvent debtor. 67 As the statutes operate in
inconsistency" would warrant recognition of an implied exception to § 3466. Otherwise, the
statement could be construed to permit a prior, specifically repealed statute to prevail over
§ 3466 if the "plainest inconsistency" existed between the statutes.
166. Nesbitt, 445 F. Supp. at 828 (quoting from statement of Rep. Mills, as chairman of
the House Ways and Means Comm. and sponsor of the Federal Tax Lien Act, 112 CONG.
REC. 22,224 (1966)).
167. The Federal Tax Lien Act governs the priority of federal tax liens; the Insolvency
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separate spheres of law, the court concluded that the Federal Tax Lien Act
and section 3466 are not facially inconsistent despite the fact that the stat-
utes differ in their treatment of the federal government vis-a-vis private
creditors.1 6' In effect, the court rejected the premise upon which the Supe-
rior Court of Pennsylvania built its statutory construction argument in In
re Meyer's Estate .169 There, the Pennsylvania court, asserting that a claim
is analogous to a lien, concluded that the tax lien priorities may be adopted
to determine the priority of tax claims generally. 70 Judge Renfrew in Nes-
bitt implied that such an application of the lien priorities is based upon an
inference and not upon the plain language of the statute.171
Second, the Nesbitt court determined that an unconditional application
of the Insolvency Statute would not render the Federal Tax Lien Act
meaningless despite the contrary opinion originally advanced in Meyer. In
Meyer, the Pennsylvania court maintained that the tax lien priorities were
only meaningful in the context of insolvency, because if the debtor pos-
sessed sufficient assets to satisfy all claims against him, the issue of priority
would be "unimportant."' 72 Therefore, the court concluded, the lien pri-
orities necessarily created an implied exception to the operation of section
3466.' Rejecting this reasoning, Judge Renfrew borrowed directly from
the Supreme Court's Key opinion.
In Key, the Court noted that section 3466 did not preclude the meaning-
ful operation of chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act in cases involving those
forms of insolvency not covered by section 3466.174 Adopting the same
rationale, Judge Renfrew asserted that an unconditional application of the
Insolvency Statute would not preclude the meaningful operation of the
Federal Tax Lien Act because the latter statute could continue to function
Statute governs the priority of federal claims. The distinction between liens and claims is
explained by Judge Renfrew as follows:
There is nothing in either the language or the legislative history of the [Federal
Tax Lien Act] to indicate that Congress intended to make tax liens the federal
government's sole remedy for the collection of unpaid taxes [representing federal
claims]. To the contrary, Congress intended tax liens to supplement existing
means for the collection of taxes, including § 3466.
Nesbitt, 445 F. Supp. at 828 (emphasis added). Judge Renfrew reasoned that because fed-
eral tax claims exist independently of federal liens, a law governing the priority of liens does
not necessarily govern the priority of the underlying claims. Id. at 828-29.
168. Id. at 828.
169. For a full discussion of Meyer, see supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
171. Nesbitt, 445 F. Supp. at 828;see supra note 167.
172. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
173. Meyer, 48 A.2d at 214-15.
174. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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in cases of insolvency outside the scope of section 3466.' Moreover,
Judge Renfrew rejected the contention that the significance of the tax lien
priorities depends upon the insolvency of the debtor.176 Though not fully
developed, this portion of Judge Renfrew's analysis goes to the very pur-
pose of the Federal Tax Lien Act. As discussed in Part I, Congress enacted
the tax lien priorities to prevent the unjust enforcement of secret federal
tax liens against certain protected classes. This purpose presupposes a con-
veyance of property from the tax debtor to an innocent party without no-
tice of the federal lien. Thus, the Federal Tax Lien Act serves its primary
purpose in circumstances entirely beyond the scope of the Insolvency Stat-
ute. Section 3466, as discussed in Part I, does not reach property divested
from the possession of the debtor. Presumably for this reason, Judge Ren-
frew concluded that an unconditional application of the Insolvency Statute
would not render the Federal Tax Lien Act meaningless.
Third, the Nesbitt court found no evidence in the legislative history of
the Federal Tax Lien Act to indicate that Congress intended to override
section 3466. In fact, the court noted, the American Bar Association on
two occasions had recommended that Congress coordinate the two statutes
to produce an express tax lien exception to the federal priority in insol-
vency. 177 On both occasions, Congress failed to take such action. 78
As the plaintiff in Nesbitt failed to satisfy any of the three conditions of
the "plainest inconsistency" test, Judge Renfrew concluded that Congress,
in enacting the Federal Tax Lien Act, did not intend to create an implied
exception to the operation of the Insolvency Statute.179
B. Propriety of the Test
The Nesbitt decision reflects the correct application of the guidelines es-
tablished by the Supreme Court. The question remains whether the Court
itself erred in formulating these guidelines to replace the ordinary rules of
statutory construction. Specifically, unresolved is the question whether ap-
plication of the "plainest inconsistency" test restricts the operation of the
Federal Tax Lien Act in a manner never contemplated by Congress.
The Nesbitt court limited the effectiveness of the tax lien priorities to
those cases not governed by the Insolvency Statute because such an inter-
pretation would not render the Federal Tax Lien Act entirely meaning-
175. Nesbitt, 445 F. Supp. at 830.
176. ld
177. Id. at 829; see also Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agendafor the Next Dec-
ade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 243 (1967).
178. Nesbitt, 445 F. Supp. at 829.
179. Id at 830.
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less.18 0 In other words, the court fitted the Federal Tax Lien Act into the
legal gaps left unfilled by the mandate of section 3466. This approach
finds support in the second part of the Supreme Court's "plainest inconsis-
tency" test.1 Nevertheless, such an approach arguably limits the tax lien
priorities in an arbitrary manner that may bear no relation to the intended
scope of the legislation. Arguably, the fact that a statute is not necessarily
irreconcilable with section 3466 should be viewed only as some evidence
that Congress did not intend to override the federal priority in insolvency.
Indeed, as the fundamental rule of statutory construction is to effectuate
legislative intent, 82 the satisfaction of each of the "plainest inconsistency"
factors should be viewed in this light. Thus, in future cases involving as-
serted exceptions to the federal priority in insolvency, the "plainest incon-
sistency" test should be applied flexibly as a rule of statutory construction
that reflects the historical deference due the Insolvency Statute. Applied in
this manner, the test supports Nesbitt. The original purpose of the tax lien
priorities 83 and Congress' conscious failure to amend the Insolvency Stat-
ute in order to accommodate the lien priorities 84 demonstrate that Con-
gress did not intend to limit the operation of the Insolvency Statute
through the Federal Tax Lien Act.
Ultimately, Congress must consider the policy objections to the Nesbitt
court's resolution of the statutory conflict. As discussed by Judge Flaherty
in Berretta,185 such a resolution tends to reduce the value of pledges and
mortgages as dependable securities. Under Nesbitt, a creditor's lien upon
the property of a debtor may become worthless in the event that the debtor
subsequently becomes insolvent while indebted to the United States. Such
an occurrence frustrates legitimate commercial expectations in a manner
that may defy the exercise of reasonable business foresight. To advance
such an argument, however, is to object to the very essence of the Insol-
vency Statute. Whether the federal government should be accorded prior-
ity in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent debtor is a fundamental
issue of government that should not be settled indirectly through judicial
180. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
181. For a statement of the three factors constituting the "plainest inconsistency" test as
originally developed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322 (1970), see
supra note 155 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 41.
183. As discussed in Part I, Congress enacted the tax lien-priorities to prevent the unjust
enforcement of secret federal liens against property previously conveyed from the possession
of the tax debtor and thus not subject to the mandate of § 3466.
184. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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construction of the federal tax lien legislation. Rather, the resolution of
this issue lies properly with Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
The Nesbitt decision raises the difficult policy issue whether the federal
government should retain its traditional priority in the distribution of the
assets of an insolvent debtor despite the unfairness and commercial insta-
bility threatened when the government asserts its priority against a party
protected by the Federal Tax Lien Act. Viewed strictly as a case of statu-
tory construction, however, Nesbitt correctly applies Supreme Court gui-
dance to conclude that the Federal Tax Lien Act does not operate as an
implied exception to the federal priority in insolvency.
Though general rules of construction suggest that the broad mandate of
section 3466 should yield to the specific priorities prescribed by the tax lien
legislation, such rules are inapplicable in light of the Supreme Court's
demonstrated attitude of special deference to the Insolvency Statute.
Rather, the three-part "plainest inconsistency" test enunciated by the
Court in United States v. Key must control the resolution of the statutory
conflict. The Nesbitt court properly applied this test. Nesbitt finds particu-
lar support in the original legislative purposes of the conflicting statutes.
While section 3466 governs the distribution of property retained by the
estate of an insolvent debtor, Congress created the tax lien legislation to
deal with property divested from the estate of the debtor. As the statutes
operate in separate spheres of law, the Nesbitt court properly concluded
that the "plainest inconsistency" does not exist between the Insolvency
Statute and the Federal Tax Lien Act.
In balancing the harshness produced by the Nesbitt rule in regard to
individual creditors with the necessity of maintaining the unrestricted op-
eration of the Insolvency Statute in order to produce government revenues,
Congress ultimately should reconsider the conflict between the Insolvency
Statute and the Federal Tax Lien Act. Until then, Nesbitt should control
the statutory conflict as the expression of Congress' present intent.
Christopher L Hencke
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